Suchergebnisse

This article describes the regulatory agencies in Norway as part of the population of state agencies by focusing on who controls and what is controlled and how. The authors analyze whether regulatory agencies are regulated and controlled to different degrees, by different external actors, and in different ways than other agencies, and on whether this control focuses on different aspects. They also examine whether the variation in regulation and control according to type of agency task is sustained if one controls for structural and cultural features. The empirical basis is a broad survey of Norwegian state agencies carried out in 2004, and the theoretical approaches embrace a task-specific, a structural-instrumental and a cultural-institutional perspective. The authors find that regulatory tasks represent a major activity for state agencies in Norway and that external control by both the executive and the legislative bodies of agencies is rather significant. Moreover, in contrast to what one would expect, given current regulatory orthodoxy, regulatory agencies are controlled to a larger extent than other agencies. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this paper is to show that regulatory risk is due to the discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies, caused by a too extensive regulatory mandate provided by the legislator. The normative point of reference and a behavioural model of regulatory agencies based on the positive theory of regulation are presented. Regulatory risk with regard to the future behaviour of regulatory agencies is modelled as the consequence of the ex ante uncertainty about the relative influence of interest groups in the regulatory process. The problem of regulatory risk is analysed separately in competitive network areas and in non-competitive network areas. For both cases a specific measure of regulatory risk is proposed. But measurement and compensation are different issues. The im-possibility of compensating for regulatory risk is demonstrated. Finally, the disaggregated regulatory mandate is presented as an institutional reform approach.

The aim of this paper is to show that regulatory risk is due to the discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies, caused by a too extensive regulatory mandate provided by the legislator. The normative point of reference and a behavioural model of regulatory agencies based on the positive theory of regulation are presented. Regulatory risk with regard to the future behaviour of regulatory agencies is modelled as the consequence of the ex ante uncertainty about the relative influence of interest groups in the regulatory process. The problem of regulatory risk is analysed separately in competitive network areas and in non-competitive network areas. For both cases a specific measure of regulatory risk is proposed. But measurement and compensation are different issues. The im-possibility of compensating for regulatory risk is demonstrated. Finally, the disaggregated regulatory mandate is presented as an institutional reform approach.

DEFINING THE TERM "REGULATORY AGENCY" IS DIFFICULT. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO OFFER A LIMITED CLASSIFICATION OF REGULATORY AGENCIES AND TO PUT THEM IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF UNELECTED GOVERNMENT BODIES OR `QUASI-GOVERNMENT', ALWAYS BEARING IN MIND THAT THE SUBJECT DEFIES TIDY DISTINCTIONS. IT INCLUDES: REGULATORY AGENCY; LEGISATIVE MANDATE; PRIVATIZED INDUSTRIES; FINANCE AND THE CITY; THE ENVIRONMENT; EMPLOYMENT, HEALTH AND SAFETY; AND, BROADCASTING AND THE PRESS. IT CONCLUDES WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISIONS, AND SUGGESTS POSSIBLE REFORMS.